qca/plugins/qca-gcrypt/pkcs5.c

/* pkcs5.c     Partial Password-Based Cryptography (PKCS#5) implementation
 * Copyright (C) 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 *
 * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
 * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software
 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301, USA
 *
 */

#include "gcrypt.h"

/*
 * 5.2 PBKDF2
 *
 *  PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an
 *  example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially
 *  unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the
 *  derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying
 *  pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.)
 *  PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.
 *
 *  PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen)
 *
 *  Options:        PRF        underlying pseudorandom function (hLen
 *                             denotes the length in octets of the
 *                             pseudorandom function output)
 *
 *  Input:          P          password, an octet string
 *                  S          salt, an octet string
 *                  c          iteration count, a positive integer
 *                  dkLen      intended length in octets of the derived
 *                             key, a positive integer, at most
 *                             (2^32 - 1) * hLen
 *
 *  Output:         DK         derived key, a dkLen-octet string
 */

gcry_error_t
gcry_pbkdf2 (int PRF, const char *P, size_t Plen, const char *S,
	     size_t Slen, unsigned int c, unsigned int dkLen, char *DK)
{
  gcry_md_hd_t prf;
  gcry_error_t rc;
  char *U;
  unsigned int u;
  unsigned int hLen;
  unsigned int l;
  unsigned int r;
  unsigned char *p;
  unsigned int i;
  unsigned int k;

  hLen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (PRF);
  if (hLen == 0)
    return GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;

  if (c == 0)
    return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;

  if (dkLen == 0)
    return GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT;

  /*
   *
   *  Steps:
   *
   *     1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and
   *        stop.
   */

  if (dkLen > 4294967295U)
    return GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE;

  /*
   *     2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key,
   *        rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last
   *        block:
   *
   *                  l = CEIL (dkLen / hLen) ,
   *                  r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen .
   *
   *        Here, CEIL (x) is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest
   *        integer greater than, or equal to, x.
   */

  l = dkLen / hLen;
  if (dkLen % hLen)
    l++;
  r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen;

  /*
   *     3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined
   *        below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and
   *        the block index to compute the block:
   *
   *                  T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,
   *                  T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,
   *                  ...
   *                  T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,
   *
   *        where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the
   *        first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF
   *        applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S
   *        and the block index i:
   *
   *                  F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c
   *
   *        where
   *
   *                  U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) ,
   *                  U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) ,
   *                  ...
   *                  U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) .
   *
   *        Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
   *        significant octet first.
   *
   *     4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to
   *        produce a derived key DK:
   *
   *                  DK = T_1 || T_2 ||  ...  || T_l<0..r-1>
   *
   *     5. Output the derived key DK.
   *
   *  Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and-
   *  suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to
   *  remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive-
   *  ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating
   *  into a small set of values.
   *
   */
  rc = gcry_md_open (&prf, PRF, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC | GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE);
  if (rc != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
    return rc;

  U = (char*)gcry_malloc(hLen);
  if (!U)
    {
      rc = GPG_ERR_ENOMEM;
      goto done;
    }

  for (i = 1; i <= l; i++)
    {
      memset(DK + (i - 1) * hLen, 0, i == l ? r : hLen);

      for (u = 1; u <= c; u++)
       {
         gcry_md_reset (prf);

         rc = gcry_md_setkey (prf, P, Plen);
         if (rc != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR) {
           goto done;
	 }
         if (u == 1)
           {
             char tmp[4];
             gcry_md_write (prf, S, Slen);
             tmp[0] = (i & 0xff000000) >> 24;
             tmp[1] = (i & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
             tmp[2] = (i & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
             tmp[3] = (i & 0x000000ff) >> 0;
             gcry_md_write (prf, tmp, 4);
           }
         else
           gcry_md_write (prf, U, hLen);

         p = gcry_md_read (prf, PRF);
         if (p == nullptr)
           {
             rc = GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION;
             goto done;
          }

         memcpy (U, p, hLen);
        for (k = 0; k < (i == l ? r : hLen); k++)
           DK[(i - 1) * hLen + k] ^= U[k];
       }
    }

  rc = GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
 done:
  gcry_md_close (prf);
  gcry_free(U);
  return rc;
}