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... and only *define* them in the source files that need them. Use DEFINE_OR_DECLARE which is set appropriately for internal builds and not non-deprecated builds. Deprecate stack-of-block Better documentation Move some ASN1 struct typedefs to types.h Update ParseC to handle this. Most of all, ParseC needed to be more consistent. The handlers are "recursive", in so far that they are called again and again until they terminate, which depends entirely on what the "massager" returns. There's a comment at the beginning of ParseC that explains how that works. {Richard Levtte} Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10669)
397 lines
11 KiB
C
397 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2009-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/cms.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include "cms_local.h"
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#include "crypto/asn1.h"
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DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo)
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int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen)
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{
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CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
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if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
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return 0;
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}
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pwri = ri->d.pwri;
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pwri->pass = pass;
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if (pass && passlen < 0)
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passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
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pwri->passlen = passlen;
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return 1;
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}
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CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
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int iter, int wrap_nid,
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int pbe_nid,
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unsigned char *pass,
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ossl_ssize_t passlen,
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const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
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{
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CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
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CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
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CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
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unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
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int ivlen;
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env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
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if (!env)
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return NULL;
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if (wrap_nid <= 0)
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wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
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if (pbe_nid <= 0)
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pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
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/* Get from enveloped data */
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if (kekciph == NULL)
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kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
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if (kekciph == NULL) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
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CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
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encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
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if (encalg == NULL) {
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goto merr;
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}
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ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
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if (ivlen > 0) {
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if (RAND_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
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goto err;
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if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
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if (!encalg->parameter) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
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CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx));
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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ctx = NULL;
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/* Initialize recipient info */
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ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
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if (ri == NULL)
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goto merr;
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ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
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if (ri->d.pwri == NULL)
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goto merr;
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ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
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pwri = ri->d.pwri;
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/* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
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X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
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pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
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if (pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm == NULL)
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goto merr;
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pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
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pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
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if (pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter == NULL)
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goto merr;
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if (!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
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&pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->
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value.sequence))
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goto merr;
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pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
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X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
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encalg = NULL;
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/* Setup PBE algorithm */
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pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
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if (pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm == NULL)
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goto err;
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CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
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pwri->version = 0;
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if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
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goto merr;
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return ri;
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merr:
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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err:
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
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if (ri)
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M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
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X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
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return NULL;
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}
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/*
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* This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211, at
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* some point this should go into EVP.
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*/
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static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
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{
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size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
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unsigned char *tmp;
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int outl, rv = 0;
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if (inlen < 2 * blocklen) {
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/* too small */
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return 0;
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}
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if (inlen % blocklen) {
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/* Invalid size */
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return 0;
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}
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if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen)) == NULL) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_KEK_UNWRAP_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
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if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
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in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2)
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/*
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* Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value
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* output it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block
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* this works because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
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*/
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|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl,
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tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen)
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/* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
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|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen)
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/* Reset IV to original value */
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|| !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
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/* Decrypt again */
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|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen))
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goto err;
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/* Check check bytes */
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if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff) {
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/* Check byte failure */
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goto err;
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}
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if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4)) {
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/* Invalid length value */
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goto err;
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}
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*outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
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memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
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rv = 1;
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err:
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OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, inlen);
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return rv;
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}
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static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
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{
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size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
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size_t olen;
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int dummy;
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/*
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* First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
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* multiple of block length.
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*/
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olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1) / blocklen;
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olen *= blocklen;
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if (olen < 2 * blocklen) {
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/* Key too small */
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return 0;
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}
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if (inlen > 0xFF) {
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/* Key too large */
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return 0;
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}
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if (out) {
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/* Set header */
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out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
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out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
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out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
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out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
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memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
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/* Add random padding to end */
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if (olen > inlen + 4
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&& RAND_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) <= 0)
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return 0;
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/* Encrypt twice */
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if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen)
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|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen))
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return 0;
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}
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*outlen = olen;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */
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int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
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int en_de)
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{
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CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
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CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
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int r = 0;
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X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx = NULL;
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const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
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unsigned char *key = NULL;
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size_t keylen;
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ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
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pwri = ri->d.pwri;
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if (pwri->pass == NULL) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
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return 0;
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}
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algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
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if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
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CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
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return 0;
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}
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kekalg = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
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algtmp->parameter);
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if (kekalg == NULL) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
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CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
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if (!kekcipher) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
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return 0;
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}
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kekctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
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if (kekctx == NULL) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
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if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
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goto err;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(kekctx, 0);
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if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
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CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
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/* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
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if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
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(char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
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algtmp->parameter, kekctx, en_de) < 0) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
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if (en_de) {
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if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx))
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goto err;
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key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
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if (key == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, kekctx))
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goto err;
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pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
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pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
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} else {
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key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
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if (key == NULL) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
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pwri->encryptedKey->data,
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pwri->encryptedKey->length, kekctx)) {
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CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
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ec->key = key;
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ec->keylen = keylen;
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}
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r = 1;
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err:
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(kekctx);
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if (!r)
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OPENSSL_free(key);
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X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
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return r;
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}
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