This is a backport of commit 1e2012b7 to 1.0.2. This hardening change
was made to 1.1.0 but was not backported to 1.0.2. Recent CVEs in user
applications have shown this additional hardening in 1.0.2 would be
beneficial.
E.g. see the patch for CVE-2019-9498
https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/0011-EAP-pwd-server-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
and CVE-2019-9499
https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/0013-EAP-pwd-client-Verify-received-scalar-and-element.patch
The original commit had this description:
We already test in EC_POINT_oct2point that points are on the curve. To
be on the safe side, move this check to
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_* so as to also check point coordinates
received through some other method.
We do not check projective coordinates, though, as
- it's unlikely that applications would be receiving this primarily
internal representation from untrusted sources, and
- it's possible that the projective setters are used in a setting where
performance matters.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8750)
Fixes#2490Fixes#8711
In commit 6db8e3bdc9e, support for Android Arm 64-bit was added to
the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module. For some reason, the corresponding
target 'android64-aarch64' was missing OpenSSL 1.0.2, whence it
could not be built with FIPS support on Android Arm 64-bit.
This commit adds the missing target.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8713)
constant time with a memory access pattern that does not depend
on secret information.
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8543)
(cherry picked from commit 9c0cf214e7836eb5aaf1ea5d3cbf6720533f86b5)
The secret point R can be recovered from S using the equation R = S - P.
The X and Z coordinates should be sufficient for that.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8505)
(cherry picked from commit 502b871ad4eacc96a31f89d9a9470ca2858da998)
The function felem_diff_128_64 in ecp_nistp521.c substracts the number |in|
from |out| mod p. In order to avoid underflow it first adds 32p mod p
(which is equivalent to 0 mod p) to |out|. The comments and variable naming
suggest that the original author intended to add 64p mod p. In fact it
has been shown that with certain unusual co-ordinates it is possible to
cause an underflow in this function when only adding 32p mod p while
performing a point double operation. By changing this to 64p mod p the
underflow is avoided.
It turns out to be quite difficult to construct points that satisfy the
underflow criteria although this has been done and the underflow
demonstrated. However none of these points are actually on the curve.
Finding points that satisfy the underflow criteria and are also *on* the
curve is considered significantly more difficult. For this reason we do
not believe that this issue is currently practically exploitable and
therefore no CVE has been assigned.
This only impacts builds using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 Configure
option.
With thanks to Bo-Yin Yang, Billy Brumley and Dr Liu for their significant
help in investigating this issue.
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8405)
(cherry picked from commit 13fbce17fc9f02e2401fc3868f3f8e02d6647e5f)
If an application calls SSL_shutdown after a fatal alert has occured and
then behaves different based on error codes from that function then the
application may be vulnerable to a padding oracle.
CVE-2019-1559
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Thanks to David Benjamin who reported this, performed the analysis and
suggested the patch. I have incorporated some of his analysis in the
comments below.
This issue can cause an out-of-bounds read. It is believed that this was
not reachable until the recent "fixed top" changes. Analysis has so far
only identified one code path that can encounter this - although it is
possible that others may be found. The one code path only impacts 1.0.2 in
certain builds. The fuzzer found a path in RSA where iqmp is too large. If
the input is all zeros, the RSA CRT logic will multiply a padded zero by
iqmp. Two mitigating factors:
- Private keys which trip this are invalid (iqmp is not reduced mod p).
Only systems which take untrusted private keys care.
- In OpenSSL 1.1.x, there is a check which rejects the oversize iqmp,
so the bug is only reproducible in 1.0.2 so far.
Fortunately, the bug appears to be relatively harmless. The consequences of
bn_cmp_word's misbehavior are:
- OpenSSL may crash if the buffers are page-aligned and the previous page is
non-existent.
- OpenSSL will incorrectly treat two BN_ULONG buffers as not equal when they
are equal.
- Side channel concerns.
The first is indeed a concern and is a DoS bug. The second is fine in this
context. bn_cmp_word and bn_cmp_part_words are used to compute abs(a0 - a1)
in Karatsuba. If a0 = a1, it does not matter whether we use a0 - a1 or
a1 - a0. The third would be worth thinking about, but it is overshadowed
by the entire Karatsuba implementation not being constant time.
Due to the difficulty of tripping this and the low impact no CVE is felt
necessary for this issue.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8326)
(cherry picked from commit 576129cd72ae054d246221f111aabf42b9c6d76d)
This commit adds a simple unit test to make sure that the constant-time
flag does not "leak" among BN_CTX frames:
- test_ctx_consttime_flag() initializes (and later frees before
returning) a BN_CTX object, then it calls in sequence
test_ctx_set_ct_flag() and test_ctx_check_ct_flag() using the same
BN_CTX object.
- test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and sets the
BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained from the frame
before ending it.
- test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a number of
BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the BIGNUMs in the new
frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set.
In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at any
depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results depending on the
patterns of sibling trees of nested function calls sharing the same
BN_CTX object, and the effect of unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the
called BN_* functions.
This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies that
the leak does not happen between two sibling functions sharing the same
BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting.
(manually cherry picked from commit fe16ae5f95fa86ddb049a8d1e2caee0b80b32282)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8295)
Cygwin binaries should not enforce text mode these days, just
use text mode if the underlying mount point requests it
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8249)
There was a trailing :w at a line, which didn't make sense in context
of the sentence/styling. Removed it, because I think it's a leftover
vi command.
CLA: trivial
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7875)
(cherry picked from commit 143b631639f95822e5e00768254fa35c787f6396)
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in
EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed
for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the
method is getting registered.
Fixes#7758
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7847)
(cherry picked from commit a86003162138031137727147c9b642d99db434b1)
Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 603221407ddc6404f8c417c6beadebf84449074c)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)
And make RSAErr call unconditional.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75f5e944be97f28867e7c489823c889d89d0bd06)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)
And make RSAErr call unconditional.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e875b0cf2f10bf2adf73e0c2ec81428290f4660c)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 89072e0c2a483f2ad678e723e112712567b0ceb1)
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)
Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
wipe it if there was no actual error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f658a3b64d8750642f4975090740865f770c2a1b)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/err/err.c
crypto/constant_time_locl.h
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7737)
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7744)
(cherry picked from commit 7b4a3515a4ddb567d48000e61d7cb640d0c5f261)
If the private key says it can only support one specific digest, then
don't ask it to perform a different one.
Fixes: #7348
(cherry picked from commit 2d263a4a73f852005b16359873475d48755999ad
and reworked for 1.0.2)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7610)
ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID is documented to return 2 for a mandatory
digest algorithm, when the key can't support any others. That isn't true
here, so return 1 instead.
Partially fixes#7348
(cherry picked from commit eb7eb1378cd15c4652884b3701d4c0ef27b5b8a6)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7610)
Blinding is performed more efficiently and securely if MONT_CTX for public
modulus is available by the time blinding parameter are instantiated. So
make sure it's the case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(manually cherry picked from commit 2cc3f68cde77af23c61fbad65470602ee86f2575)
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7586)
dsa_builtin_paramgen2 expects the L parameter to be greater than N,
otherwise the generation will get stuck in an infinite loop.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3afd38b277a806b901e039c6ad281c5e5c97ef67)
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7493)
