The functions that check for the provider being runnable are: new, init, final
and dupctx.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12801)
Some modes (e.g., CBC and OFB) update the effective IV with each
block-cipher invocation, making the "IV" stored in the (historically)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX or (current) PROV_CIPHER_CTX distinct from the initial
IV passed in at cipher initialization time. The latter is stored in
the "oiv" (original IV) field, and has historically been accessible
via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_original_iv() API. The "effective IV" has
also historically been accessible, via both EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv()
and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(), the latter of which allows for
*write* access to the internal cipher state. This is particularly
problematic given that provider-internal cipher state need not, in
general, even be accessible from the same address space as libcrypto,
so these APIs are not sustainable in the long term. However, it still
remains necessary to provide access to the contents of the "IV state"
(e.g., when serializing cipher state for in-kernel TLS); a subsequent
reinitialization of a cipher context using the "IV state" as the
input IV will be able to resume processing of data in a compatible
manner.
This problem was introduced in commit
089cb623be76b88a1eea6fcd135101037661bbc3, which effectively caused
all IV queries to return the "original IV", removing access to the
current IV state of the cipher.
These functions for accessing the (even the "original") IV had remained
undocumented for quite some time, presumably due to unease about
exposing the internals of the cipher state in such a manner.
Note that this also as a side effect "fixes" some "bugs" where things
had been referring to the 'iv' field that should have been using the
'oiv' field. It also fixes the EVP_CTRL_GET_IV cipher control,
which was clearly intended to expose the non-original IV, for
use exporting the cipher state into the kernel for kTLS.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12233)
The test added previously used a 16 byte block during the update which does not cause internal buffering in the provider.
Some internal variables related to the buffering were not being cleared in the init, which meant that the second
update would use the buffered data from the first update.
Added test for this scenario with exclusions for ciphers that do not support partial block updates.
Found by guidovranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12523)
The new naming scheme consistently usese the `OSSL_FUNC_` prefix for all
functions which are dispatched between the core and providers.
This change includes in particular all up- and downcalls, i.e., the
dispatched functions passed from core to provider and vice versa.
- OSSL_core_ -> OSSL_FUNC_core_
- OSSL_provider_ -> OSSL_FUNC_core_
For operations and their function dispatch tables, the following convention
is used:
Type | Name (evp_generic_fetch(3)) |
---------------------|-----------------------------------|
operation | OSSL_OP_FOO |
function id | OSSL_FUNC_FOO_FUNCTION_NAME |
function "name" | OSSL_FUNC_foo_function_name |
function typedef | OSSL_FUNC_foo_function_name_fn |
function ptr getter | OSSL_FUNC_foo_function_name |
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12222)
When we're fetching an IV, there's no need to enforce that the
provided buffer is exactly the same size as the IV we want to
write into it. This might happen, for example, when
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst() passes sizeof(ctx->iv) (that is,
EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) for an AES-GCM cipher that uses a shorter IV.
AES-OCB and CCM were also affected.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12039)
OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV can be accessed both as an octet string and as
an octet pointer (for routines like EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv() that are
in a nebulous undocumented-and-might-go-away-eventually state),
the latter for when there is need to modify the actual value in
the provider.
Make sure that we consistently try to set it as both the string and pointer
forms (not just octet string) and only fail if neither version succeeds. The
generic cipher get_ctx_params routine was already doing so, but the
AES-variant-, GCM-, and CCM-specific ones were not.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12039)
Avoid function calls we don't need to do.
In 1.1.1 we have:
aes-128-cbc 572267.80k 681197.08k 715430.74k 720508.59k 722359.64k 723004.07k
Current master:
aes-128-cbc 460663.70k 631125.66k 701283.58k 719794.52k 724732.59k 726668.63k
new:
aes-128-cbc 582057.64k 684288.62k 715721.90k 724856.15k 717578.24k 727176.53k
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11102)
Use of the low level AES functions has been informally discouraged for a
long time. We now formally deprecate them.
Applications should instead use the EVP APIs, e.g. EVP_EncryptInit_ex,
EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the equivalently named decrypt
functions.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10580)
The idea to have all these things in providers/common was viable as
long as the implementations was spread around their main providers.
This is, however, no longer the case, so we move the common blocks
closer to the source that use them.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10564)
If we call EVP_EncryptUpdate/EVP_DecryptUpdate with length 0 we should
be able to handle it. Most importantly we shouldn't get different
results if we do this compared to if we don't!
An exception is made for CCM mode which has special handling for this in
the low level cipher function.
Fixes#8675
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10530)
Fixes#10438
issue found by clusterfuzz/ossfuzz
The dest was getting a copy of the src structure which contained a pointer that should point to an offset inside itself - because of the copy it was pointing to the original structure.
The setup for a ctx is mainly done by the initkey method in the PROV_CIPHER_HW structure. Because of this it makes sense that the structure should also contain a copyctx method that is use to resolve any pointers that need to be setup.
A dup_ctx has been added to the cipher_enc tests in evp_test. It does a dup after setup and then frees the original ctx. This detects any floating pointers in the duplicated context that were pointing back to the freed ctx.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10443)
The end up in providers/common/include/prov/.
All inclusions are adjusted accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
New name is providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
All inclusions are adapted accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
From providers/{common,default}/ to providers/implementations/
Except for common code, which remains in providers/common/ciphers/.
However, we do move providers/common/include/internal/ciphers/*.h
to providers/common/include/prov/, and adjust all source including
any of those header files.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10088)
