Too many KeyUpdate message could be inicative of a problem (e.g. an
infinite KeyUpdate loop if the peer always responds to a KeyUpdate message
with an "update_requested" KeyUpdate response), or (conceivably) an attack.
Either way we limit the number of KeyUpdate messages we are prepared to
handle.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2609)
This mops up various edge cases with key_shares and makes sure we still
generate the handshake secret if we haven't been provided with one but we
have a PSK.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
Requires a refactor of the ServerHello parsing, so that we parse first and
then subsequently process. This is because the resumption information is
held in the extensions block which is parsed last - but we need to know that
information earlier.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
The record layer was making decisions that should really be left to the
state machine around unexpected handshake messages that are received after
the initial handshake (i.e. renegotiation related messages). This commit
removes that code from the record layer and updates the state machine
accordingly. This simplifies the state machine and paves the way for
handling other messages post-handshake such as the NewSessionTicket in
TLSv1.3.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
We remove the separate CertificateStatus message for TLSv1.3, and instead
send back the response in the appropriate Certificate message extension.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2020)
Various functions got renamed. We need to rename the error codes too.
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The _clienthello_ in the extensions parsing functions is overly specific.
Better to keep the convention to just _client_
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This lays the foundation for a later move to have the extensions built and
placed into the correct message for TLSv1.3 (e.g. ServerHello or
EncryptedExtensions).
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This builds on the work started in 1ab3836b3 and extends is so that
each extension has its own identified parsing functions, as well as an
allowed context identifying which messages and protocols it is relevant for.
Subsequent commits will do a similar job for the ServerHello extensions.
This will enable us to have common functions for processing extension blocks
no matter which of the multiple messages they are received from. In TLSv1.3
a number of different messages have extension blocks, and some extensions
have moved from one message to another when compared to TLSv1.2.
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
At this stage the message is just empty. We need to fill it in with
extension data.
Perl changes reviewed by Richard Levitte. Non-perl changes reviewed by Rich
Salz
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There is a set of miscellaneous processing for OCSP, CT etc at the end of
the ServerDone processing. In TLS1.3 we don't have a ServerDone, so this
needs to move elsewhere.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This is a major overhaul of the TLSv1.3 state machine. Currently it still
looks like TLSv1.2. This commit changes things around so that it starts
to look a bit less like TLSv1.2 and bit more like TLSv1.3.
After this commit we have:
ClientHello
+ key_share ---->
ServerHello
+key_share
{CertificateRequest*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateStatus*}
<---- {Finished}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} ---->
[ApplicationData] <---> [Application Data]
Key differences between this intermediate position and the final TLSv1.3
position are:
- No EncryptedExtensions message yet
- No server side CertificateVerify message yet
- CertificateStatus still exists as a separate message
- A number of the messages are still in the TLSv1.2 format
- Still running on the TLSv1.2 record layer
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The previous commits put in place the logic to exchange key_share data. We
now need to do something with that information. In <= TLSv1.2 the equivalent
of the key_share extension is the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange
messages. With key_share those two messages are no longer necessary.
The commit removes the SKE and CKE messages from the TLSv1.3 state machine.
TLSv1.3 is completely different to TLSv1.2 in the messages that it sends
and the transitions that are allowed. Therefore, rather than extend the
existing <=TLS1.2 state transition functions, we create a whole new set for
TLSv1.3. Intially these are still based on the TLSv1.2 ones, but over time
they will be amended.
The new TLSv1.3 transitions remove SKE and CKE completely. There's also some
cleanup for some stuff which is not relevant to TLSv1.3 and is easy to
remove, e.g. the DTLS support (we're not doing DTLSv1.3 yet) and NPN.
I also disable EXTMS for TLSv1.3. Using it was causing some added
complexity, so rather than fix it I removed it, since eventually it will not
be needed anyway.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
At the moment the server doesn't yet do anything with this information.
We still need to send the server's key_share info back to the client. That
will happen in subsequent commits.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Done too soon, this is for future OpenSSL 1.2.0
This reverts commit 6c62f9e1639a7d1a879f363a99882920104dfedb.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.
Issue reported by Shi Lei.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
