Fixes#7228
The function BIO_get_host_ip uses gethostbyname, which is not thread safe
and hence we grab a lock. In multi-threaded applications, this lock sometimes
causes performance bottlenecks.
This patch uses the function gethostbyname_r (thread safe version), when
available.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7250)
This commit documents the OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT which is currently
missing in the man page.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7301)
(cherry picked from commit 7c69495712e3dc9aa8db38271f0c3faeb2037165)
This module includes bn.h via other headers, so it picks up the
definition from there and doesn't need to define them locally (any
more?). Worst case scenario, the redefinition may be different and
cause all sorts of compile errors.
Fixes#7227
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7287)
(cherry picked from commit dda5396aaec315bdbcb080e42fb5cd0191f2ad72)
Fixes#7240
In FIPS mode, the default FIPS DRBG uses the drbg_get_entropy()
callback to reseed itself, which is provided by the wrapping
libcrypto library. This callback in turn uses ssleay_rand_bytes()
to generate random bytes.
Now ssleay_rand_bytes() calls RAND_poll() once on first call to
seed itself, but RAND_poll() is never called again (unless the
application calls RAND_poll() explicitely). This implies that
whenever the DRBG reseeds itself (which happens every 2^14
generate requests) this happens without obtaining fresh random
data from the operating system's entropy sources.
This patch forces a reseed from system entropy sources on every
call to drbg_get_entropy(). In contrary to the automatic reseeding
of the DRBG in master, this reseeding does not break applications
running in a chroot() environment (see c7504aeb640a), because the
SSLEAY PRNG does not maintain an error state. (It does not even
check the return value of RAND_poll() on its instantiation.)
In the worst case, if no random device is available for reseeding,
no fresh entropy will be added to the SSLEAY PRNG but it will happily
continue to generate random bytes as 'entropy' input for the DRBG's
reseeding, which is just as good (or bad) as before this patch.
To prevent ssleay_rand_bytes_from_system() (and hence RAND_poll())
from being called twice during instantiation, a separate
drbg_get_nonce() callback has been introduced, which is identical
with the previous implementation of drbg_get_entropy().
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7259)
These both indicate that the file descriptor we're trying to use as a
terminal isn't, in fact, a terminal.
Fixes#7271
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7272)
(cherry picked from commit 276bf8620ce35a613c856f2b70348f65ffe94067)
(cherry picked from commit ad1730359220cef5903d16c7f58b602fc3713414)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7166)
(cherry picked from commit e13dc23cc0fd64c304c25a67d5fa516a77f9e8f1)
Since the SSL code started using RSA_NO_PADDING, the CAPI engine became
unusable. This change fixes that.
Fixes#7131
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7132)
Found by Coverity
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7169)
(cherry picked from commit 512d811719fc955f574090af4c3586a9aba46fa7)
With the introduction of -pkeyopt, the number of bits may change
without |newkey| being updated. Unfortunately, there is no API to
retrieve the information from a EVP_PKEY_CTX either, so chances are
that we report incorrect information. For the moment, it's better not
to try to report the number of bits at all.
Fixes#7086
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7096)
(cherry picked from commit 17147181bd3f97c53592e2a5c9319b854b954039)
They did not make it clear how the memory management works for the |pctx|
parameter.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7043)
The default input format is PEM, so explicit "-inform DER" is needed to
read DER-encoded CRL.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7094)
(cherry picked from commit 785e614a95a134831f213749332bcf40c4920f69)
(cherry picked from commit e25fc6b5b2b99ed02f8966192c94c820b6f69add)
This trivial patch removes a duplicated call to ASN1_INTEGER_set.
Fixes Issue #6977
Signed-off-by: Eric Brown <browne@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6984)
(cherry picked from commit 59701e6363531cddef5b2114c0127b8453deb1f3)
(cherry picked from commit e02c519cd32a55e6ad39a0cfbeeda775f9115f28)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_blind.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
In [most common] case of p and q being of same width, it's possible to
replace CRT modulo operations with Montgomery reductions. And those are
even fixed-length Montgomery reductions...
(cherry picked from commit 41bfd5e7c8ac3a0874a94e4d15c006ad5eb48e59)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
Add bn_mul_fixed_top, bn_from_mont_fixed_top, bn_mod_sub_fixed_top.
Switch to bn_{mul|sqr}_fixed_top in bn_mul_mont_fixed_top and remove
memset in bn_from_montgomery_word.
(cherry picked from commit fcc4ee09473cac511eca90faa003661c7786e4f9)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
crypto/bn_int.h
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6942)
the option is provided in the -help message of the s_server utility
but it is not documented in the man page, this fixes it
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7046)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6916)
(cherry picked from commit 0da7358b0757fa35f2c3a8f51fa036466ae50fd7)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
Just as was done recently for i2d_ASN1_OBJECT, we also make
i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN comply with the documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6943)
Since 0.9.7, all i2d_ functions were documented to allocate an output
buffer if the user didn't provide one, under these conditions (from
the 1.0.2 documentation):
For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
data just written.
i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was found not to do this, and would crash if a NULL
output buffer was provided.
Fixes#6914
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6918)
(cherry picked from commit 6114041540d8d1fecaf23a861788c3c742d3b467)
It was false positive, but one can as well view it as readability issue.
Switch even to unsigned indices because % BN_BYTES takes 4-6 instructions
with signed dividend vs. 1 (one) with unsigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889)
(cherry picked from commit 83e034379fa3f6f0d308ec75fbcb137e26154aec)
"Computationally constant-time" means that it might still leak
information about input's length, but only in cases when input
is missing complete BN_ULONG limbs. But even then leak is possible
only if attacker can observe memory access pattern with limb
granularity.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6889)
(cherry picked from commit 89d8aade5f4011ddeea7827f08ec544c914f275a)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
Those even order that do not play nicely with Montgomery arithmetic
(back-ported from commit 3a6a4a93518fbb3d96632bfdcb538d340f29c56b)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
New implementation failed to correctly reset r->neg flag. Spotted by
OSSFuzz.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
(cherry picked from commit 70a579ae2f37437a1e02331eeaa84e1b68ba021e)
Originally suggested solution for "Return Of the Hidden Number Problem"
is arguably too expensive. While it has marginal impact on slower
curves, none to ~6%, optimized implementations suffer real penalties.
Most notably sign with P-256 went more than 2 times[!] slower. Instead,
just implement constant-time BN_mod_add_quick.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
(cherry picked from commit 3fc7a9b96cbed0c3da6f53c08e34d8d0c982745f)
Resolved onflicts:
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
Note that exported functions maintain original behaviour, so that
external callers won't observe difference. While internally we can
now perform Montogomery multiplication on fixed-length vectors, fixed
at modulus size. The new functions, bn_to_mont_fixed_top and
bn_mul_mont_fixed_top, are declared in bn_int.h, because one can use
them even outside bn, e.g. in RSA, DSA, ECDSA...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
(cherry picked from commit 71883868ea5b33416ae8283bcc38dd2d97e5006b)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
crypto/include/internal/bn_int.h
The new flag marks vectors that were not treated with bn_correct_top,
in other words such vectors are permitted to be zero padded. For now
it's BN_DEBUG-only flag, as initial use case for zero-padded vectors
would be controlled Montgomery multiplication/exponentiation, not
general purpose. For general purpose use another type might be more
appropriate. Advantage of this suggestion is that it's possible to
back-port it...
bn/bn_div.c: fix memory sanitizer problem.
bn/bn_sqr.c: harmonize with BN_mul.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
(cherry picked from commit 305b68f1a2b6d4d0aa07a6ab47ac372f067a40bb)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
Trouble is that addition is postponing expansion till carry is
calculated, and if addition carries, top word can be zero, which
triggers assertion in bn_check_top.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6810)
(cherry picked from commit e42395e637c3507b80b25c7ed63236898822d2f1)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But
the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger
primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075Fixes: #6012
(cherry picked from commit feac7a1c8be49fbcb76fcb721ec9f02fdd91030e)
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit.
We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for
DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075
(cherry picked from commit 74ee379651fb2bb12c6f7eb9fa10e70be89ac7c8)
Thanks to Jiecheng Wu, Zuxing Gu for the report.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6791)
(cherry picked from commit 037241bf046be8cfc7e9216959393dd20b06fc21)
(Only the EC part)
ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine is called when application attempts to use
custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though it was wrong, it didn't
affect point operations, they were just not as fast as expected.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6761)
As per RFC 7292.
Fixes#6665
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6708)
(cherry picked from commit b709babbca0498cd2b05f543b09f57f4a670298e)
Change the description for BN_hex2bn() so that it uses the same BIGNUM argument name as its prototype.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6712)
We should validate that the various fields we put into the
CertificateRequest are not too long. Otherwise we will construct an
invalid message.
Fixes#6609
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6629)
