Fix logic around when to send an HRR based on cookies

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4435)
This commit is contained in:
Matt Caswell 2017-09-13 14:50:49 +01:00
parent 042c57539b
commit c36001c3a8
5 changed files with 123 additions and 62 deletions

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@ -5310,5 +5310,8 @@ int SSL_stateless(SSL *s)
ret = SSL_accept(s); ret = SSL_accept(s);
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS; s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS;
if (s->ext.cookieok)
return 1;
return ret; return ret;
} }

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@ -1276,6 +1276,9 @@ struct ssl_st {
/* May be sent by a server in HRR. Must be echoed back in ClientHello */ /* May be sent by a server in HRR. Must be echoed back in ClientHello */
unsigned char *tls13_cookie; unsigned char *tls13_cookie;
size_t tls13_cookie_len; size_t tls13_cookie_len;
/* Have we received a cookie from the client? */
int cookieok;
/* /*
* Maximum Fragment Length as per RFC 4366. * Maximum Fragment Length as per RFC 4366.
* If this member contains one of the allowed values (1-4) * If this member contains one of the allowed values (1-4)

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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent); static int final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent);
static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context); static int init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
@ -1237,85 +1238,136 @@ static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
return 0; return 0;
} }
/* /*
* If * IF
* we are a server * we are a server
* AND
* we have no key_share
* THEN * THEN
* If * IF
* we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest * we have a suitable key_share
* AND
* the client sent a key_share extension
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
* AND
* a shared group exists
* THEN * THEN
* send a HelloRetryRequest * IF
* ELSE If * we are stateless AND we have no cookie
* we are not resuming * THEN
* OR * send a HelloRetryRequest
* the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes * ELSE
* THEN * IF
* fail; * we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
* AND
* the client sent a key_share extension
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
* AND
* a shared group exists
* THEN
* send a HelloRetryRequest
* ELSE IF
* we are not resuming
* OR
* the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
* THEN
* fail
* ELSE IF
* we are stateless AND we have no cookie
* THEN
* send a HelloRetryRequest
*/ */
if (s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) { if (s->server) {
/* No suitable share */ if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent /* We have a suitable key_share */
&& (!s->hit if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) && !s->ext.cookieok) {
!= 0)) { if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) {
const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups; /*
size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i; * If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any
unsigned int group_id = 0; * previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other
* than 0?
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
return 1;
}
} else {
/* No suitable key_share */
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && sent
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
!= 0)) {
const uint16_t *pgroups, *clntgroups;
size_t num_groups, clnt_num_groups, i;
unsigned int group_id = 0;
/* Check if a shared group exists */ /* Check if a shared group exists */
/* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
/* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */ /*
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { * Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list
group_id = pgroups[i]; */
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
group_id = pgroups[i];
if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 1)) if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups,
break; 1))
break;
}
if (i < num_groups) {
/* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
return 1;
}
}
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
SSLfatal(s, sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
: SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION,
SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
} }
if (i < num_groups) { if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0
/* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */ && !s->ext.cookieok) {
s->s3->group_id = group_id; if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)) {
/*
* If we are stateless then we wouldn't know about any
* previously sent HRR - so how can this be anything other
* than 0?
*/
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
return 1; return 1;
} }
} }
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) { /*
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */ * We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest
SSLfatal(s, * messages
sent ? SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE : SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, */
SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE;
} else {
/*
* For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
* the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0; return 0;
} }
} }
/* We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest messages */
if (s->server && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_COMPLETE;
/*
* For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
* the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1; return 1;
} }
#endif #endif

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@ -895,6 +895,8 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
/* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */ /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
s->hello_retry_request = 1; s->hello_retry_request = 1;
s->ext.cookieok = 1;
return 1; return 1;
} }

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@ -687,7 +687,8 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING) if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
&& (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through */ /* Fall through */