Check Suite-B constraints with EE DANE records

When DANE-EE(3) matches or either of DANE-EE/PKIX-EE fails, we don't
build a chain at all, but rather succeed or fail with just the leaf
certificate.  In either case also check for Suite-B violations.

As unlikely as it may seem that anyone would enable both DANE and
Suite-B, we should do what the application asks.

Took the opportunity to eliminate the "cb" variables in x509_vfy.c,
just call ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Dukhovni 2016-01-17 16:50:52 -05:00
parent bd5192b101
commit 6e32825631
2 changed files with 46 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@ -398,11 +398,12 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
unsigned long tflags;
EVP_PKEY *pk;
unsigned long tflags = flags;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
tflags = flags;
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
@ -410,6 +411,17 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
} else
i = 0;
pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
/*
* With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
* a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
* Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
* pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
*/
if (chain == NULL)
return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
@ -417,7 +429,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
goto end;
}
pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {

View File

@ -193,7 +193,6 @@ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
int err;
int ok;
@ -214,7 +213,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (err != X509_V_OK) {
ctx->error = err;
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
if ((ok = cb(0, ctx)) == 0)
if ((ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) == 0)
return ok;
}
@ -373,11 +372,9 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int purpose;
int allow_proxy_certs;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
@ -415,7 +412,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -423,7 +420,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -457,7 +454,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (ret == 0) {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -469,7 +466,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -481,7 +478,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -498,7 +495,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -595,7 +592,6 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
int i, ok = 0;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509 *mx;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
int trust;
@ -676,7 +672,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
@ -1568,9 +1564,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int ok = 0, n;
X509 *xs, *xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
ctx->error_depth = n;
@ -1597,7 +1590,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (n <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto end;
} else {
n--;
@ -1622,13 +1615,13 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
@ -1642,7 +1635,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
ok = ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
@ -2584,10 +2577,21 @@ static void dane_reset(struct dane_st *dane)
dane->pdpth = -1;
}
static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
if (err == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->error = err;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int matched;
int done;
@ -2601,9 +2605,11 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
if (matched > 0) {
if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
return 0;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
return cb(1, ctx);
return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
}
if (matched < 0) {
@ -2615,10 +2621,12 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
if (done) {
/* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
return 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
return cb(0, ctx);
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
/*
@ -2631,7 +2639,6 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
@ -2944,6 +2951,6 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
dane_reset(dane);
return cb(0, ctx);
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
}