QuasarApp/openssl
4
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/QuasarApp/openssl.git synced 2025-05-06 14:39:40 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Ensure correct chain depth for policy checks with DANE bare key TA

Browse Source 
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Dukhovni 2016-01-31 21:48:00 -05:00
parent 895c2f84a6
commit 3921ded79a
1 changed files with 19 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

19
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View File

@ -1501,10 +1501,29 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{ {
int ret; int ret;
if (ctx->parent) if (ctx->parent)
return 1; return 1;
/*
* With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
* certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
* certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
* chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
* chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
* at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
* element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
* was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
* X509_policy_check() call.
*/
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0; return 0;