QuasarApp/openssl
4
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/QuasarApp/openssl.git synced 2025-04-30 03:34:39 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Whitespace cleanup in crypto

Browse Source 
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
This commit is contained in:
FdaSilvaYY 2016-06-28 22:51:01 +02:00 committed by Rich Salz
parent 0517ffc47c
commit 02e112a885
23 changed files with 30 additions and 31 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
crypto/bn/bn_div.c
View File

@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
/*- /*-
* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
* zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. * zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds.
* Thus: * Thus:
* dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero) * dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero)

2
crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
View File

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
bn_check_top(m); bn_check_top(m);
/*- /*-
* For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
* a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery * a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
* exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
* reductions, and combine the results using the CRT. * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.

4
crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
View File

@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ BIGNUM *int_bn_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
* i.e. * i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
* *
* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* i.e. * i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|). * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
* *
* So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|), * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|). * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time. * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.

1
crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
View File

@ -284,7 +284,6 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
} else } else
BN_zero(group->cofactor); BN_zero(group->cofactor);
/* /*
* Some groups have an order with * Some groups have an order with
* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail. * factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.

2
crypto/modes/ocb128.c
View File

@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(OCB128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char *iv,
/* /*
* Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths. * Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths.
* We don't support this at this stage * We don't support this at this stage
*/ */
if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) { if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) {
return -1; return -1;

2
crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
View File

@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
BIO_free_all(btmp); BIO_free_all(btmp);
BIO_free_all(etmp); BIO_free_all(etmp);
BIO_free_all(bio); BIO_free_all(bio);
return NULL; return NULL;
} }
static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid) static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)

2
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
View File

@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
/* /*
* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
* leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
* information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
* pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
* *
* TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.

2
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View File

@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
/* /*
* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
* further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
*/ */
if (dane->mdpth >= 0) if (dane->mdpth >= 0)

2
include/openssl/bn.h
View File

@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int BN_get_flags(const BIGNUM *b, int n);
*/ */
void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags); void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags);
/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier, */ /* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier */
int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b); int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void); BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void);