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/*
[PROV][KEYMGMT][EC] Import/export of priv_key as padded const time BN For EC keys it is particularly important to avoid leaking the bit length of the secret scalar. Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key. For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length, using the new `ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad()`. When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived, the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for constant time implementations in the backend. Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed size big enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory accesses. Fixed length ------------ The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid secret scalars. For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order converted to bytes (rounding up). For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words" required for the internal representation of the order, and we preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing might temporarily overflow the order length. Future work ----------- To ensure the flag and fixed size preallocation persists upon `EC_KEY_set_private_key()`, we need to further harden `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` and `BN_copy()`. This is done in separate commits. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
2020-01-21 16:48:49 +02:00
* Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* ECDH/ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
[PROV][KEYMGMT][EC] Import/export of priv_key as padded const time BN For EC keys it is particularly important to avoid leaking the bit length of the secret scalar. Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key. For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length, using the new `ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad()`. When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived, the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for constant time implementations in the backend. Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed size big enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory accesses. Fixed length ------------ The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid secret scalars. For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order converted to bytes (rounding up). For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words" required for the internal representation of the order, and we preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing might temporarily overflow the order length. Future work ----------- To ensure the flag and fixed size preallocation persists upon `EC_KEY_set_private_key()`, we need to further harden `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` and `BN_copy()`. This is done in separate commits. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
2020-01-21 16:48:49 +02:00
#include "crypto/bn.h"
#include "crypto/ec.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "internal/param_build_set.h"
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_new_fn ec_newdata;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_init_fn ec_gen_init;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_set_template_fn ec_gen_set_template;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_set_params_fn ec_gen_set_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_settable_params_fn ec_gen_settable_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_fn ec_gen;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_cleanup_fn ec_gen_cleanup;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_load_fn ec_load;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_free_fn ec_freedata;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_get_params_fn ec_get_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gettable_params_fn ec_gettable_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_set_params_fn ec_set_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_settable_params_fn ec_settable_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn ec_has;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_match_fn ec_match;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_validate_fn ec_validate;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_fn ec_import;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn ec_import_types;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_fn ec_export;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn ec_export_types;
static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_query_operation_name_fn ec_query_operation_name;
#define EC_DEFAULT_MD "SHA256"
#define EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS \
(OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR | OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS)
static
const char *ec_query_operation_name(int operation_id)
{
switch (operation_id) {
case OSSL_OP_KEYEXCH:
return "ECDH";
case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE:
return "ECDSA";
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Callers of key_to_params MUST make sure that domparams_to_params is also
* called!
*
* This function only exports the bare keypair, domain parameters and other
* parameters are exported separately.
*/
static ossl_inline
int key_to_params(const EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl,
OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private,
unsigned char **pub_key)
{
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
const EC_POINT *pub_point = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
size_t pub_key_len = 0;
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
if (eckey == NULL
|| (ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL)
return 0;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
pub_point = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey);
if (pub_point != NULL) {
OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL, *px = NULL, *py = NULL;
/*
* EC_POINT_point2buf() can generate random numbers in some
* implementations so we need to ensure we use the correct libctx.
*/
bnctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(eckey));
if (bnctx == NULL)
goto err;
/* If we are doing a get then check first before decoding the point */
if (tmpl == NULL) {
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY);
px = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_PUB_X);
py = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_PUB_Y);
}
if (p != NULL || tmpl != NULL) {
/* convert pub_point to a octet string according to the SECG standard */
if ((pub_key_len = EC_POINT_point2buf(ecg, pub_point,
POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED,
pub_key, bnctx)) == 0
|| !ossl_param_build_set_octet_string(tmpl, p,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
*pub_key, pub_key_len))
goto err;
}
if (px != NULL || py != NULL) {
if (px != NULL)
x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx);
if (py != NULL)
y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx);
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(ecg, pub_point, x, y, bnctx))
goto err;
if (px != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_bn(tmpl, px,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_PUB_X, x))
goto err;
if (py != NULL
&& !ossl_param_build_set_bn(tmpl, py,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_PUB_Y, y))
goto err;
}
}
[PROV][KEYMGMT][EC] Import/export of priv_key as padded const time BN For EC keys it is particularly important to avoid leaking the bit length of the secret scalar. Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key. For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length, using the new `ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad()`. When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived, the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for constant time implementations in the backend. Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed size big enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory accesses. Fixed length ------------ The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid secret scalars. For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order converted to bytes (rounding up). For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words" required for the internal representation of the order, and we preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing might temporarily overflow the order length. Future work ----------- To ensure the flag and fixed size preallocation persists upon `EC_KEY_set_private_key()`, we need to further harden `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` and `BN_copy()`. This is done in separate commits. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
2020-01-21 16:48:49 +02:00
if (priv_key != NULL && include_private) {
size_t sz;
int ecbits;
/*
* Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret
* scalar in the key.
*
* For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length.
*
* When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived,
* the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as
* soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for
* constant time implementations in the backend.
*
* Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
* to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
* enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
* a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
* accesses.
*
* Fixed Length
* ------------
*
* The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
* a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
* generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
* secret scalars.
*
* For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order
* converted to bytes (rounding up).
*
* For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
* required for the internal representation of the order, and we
* preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
* might temporarily overflow the order length.
*/
ecbits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(ecg);
if (ecbits <= 0)
goto err;
sz = (ecbits + 7 ) / 8;
if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn_pad(tmpl, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
priv_key, sz))
[PROV][KEYMGMT][EC] Import/export of priv_key as padded const time BN For EC keys it is particularly important to avoid leaking the bit length of the secret scalar. Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key. For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length, using the new `ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad()`. When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived, the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for constant time implementations in the backend. Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed size big enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory accesses. Fixed length ------------ The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid secret scalars. For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order converted to bytes (rounding up). For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words" required for the internal representation of the order, and we preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing might temporarily overflow the order length. Future work ----------- To ensure the flag and fixed size preallocation persists upon `EC_KEY_set_private_key()`, we need to further harden `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` and `BN_copy()`. This is done in separate commits. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10631)
2020-01-21 16:48:49 +02:00
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return ret;
}
static ossl_inline
int otherparams_to_params(const EC_KEY *ec, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl,
OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
int ecdh_cofactor_mode = 0;
if (ec == NULL)
return 0;
ecdh_cofactor_mode =
(EC_KEY_get_flags(ec) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) ? 1 : 0;
return ossl_param_build_set_int(tmpl, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH,
ecdh_cofactor_mode);
}
static
void *ec_newdata(void *provctx)
{
return EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx), NULL);
}
static
void ec_freedata(void *keydata)
{
EC_KEY_free(keydata);
}
static
int ec_has(void *keydata, int selection)
{
EC_KEY *ec = keydata;
int ok = 0;
if (ec != NULL) {
if ((selection & EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
ok = 1;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0)
ok = ok && (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) != NULL);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0)
ok = ok && (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec) != NULL);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
ok = ok && (EC_KEY_get0_group(ec) != NULL);
/*
* We consider OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS to always be
* available, so no extra check is needed other than the previous one
* against EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS.
*/
}
return ok;
}
static int ec_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
{
const EC_KEY *ec1 = keydata1;
const EC_KEY *ec2 = keydata2;
const EC_GROUP *group_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec1);
const EC_GROUP *group_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec2);
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(ec1));
int ok = 1;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
ok = ok && group_a != NULL && group_b != NULL
&& EC_GROUP_cmp(group_a, group_b, ctx) == 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) {
const BIGNUM *pa = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec1);
const BIGNUM *pb = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec2);
ok = ok && BN_cmp(pa, pb) == 0;
}
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0) {
const EC_POINT *pa = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec1);
const EC_POINT *pb = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec2);
ok = ok && EC_POINT_cmp(group_b, pa, pb, ctx) == 0;
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
static
int ec_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
EC_KEY *ec = keydata;
int ok = 1;
if (ec == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* In this implementation, we can export/import only keydata in the
* following combinations:
* - domain parameters (+optional other params)
* - public key with associated domain parameters (+optional other params)
* - private key with associated public key and domain parameters
* (+optional other params)
*
* This means:
* - domain parameters must always be requested
* - private key must be requested alongside public key
* - other parameters are always optional
*/
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) == 0)
return 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0
&& (selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) == 0)
return 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
ok = ok && ec_group_fromdata(ec, params);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
int include_private =
selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY ? 1 : 0;
ok = ok && ec_key_fromdata(ec, params, include_private);
}
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS) != 0)
ok = ok && ec_key_otherparams_fromdata(ec, params);
return ok;
}
static
int ec_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb,
void *cbarg)
{
EC_KEY *ec = keydata;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
unsigned char *pub_key = NULL, *genbuf = NULL;
BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
int ok = 1;
if (ec == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* In this implementation, we can export/import only keydata in the
* following combinations:
* - domain parameters (+optional other params)
* - public key with associated domain parameters (+optional other params)
* - private key with associated public key and domain parameters
* (+optional other params)
*
* This means:
* - domain parameters must always be requested
* - private key must be requested alongside public key
* - other parameters are always optional
*/
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) == 0)
return 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0
&& (selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) == 0)
return 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS) != 0
&& (selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) == 0)
return 0;
tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
if (tmpl == NULL)
return 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0) {
bnctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(ec));
BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
ok = ok && (bnctx != NULL);
ok = ok && ec_group_todata(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec), tmpl, NULL,
ec_key_get_libctx(ec), ec_key_get0_propq(ec),
bnctx, &genbuf);
}
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) {
int include_private =
selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY ? 1 : 0;
ok = ok && key_to_params(ec, tmpl, NULL, include_private, &pub_key);
}
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS) != 0)
ok = ok && otherparams_to_params(ec, tmpl, NULL);
if (ok && (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) != NULL)
ok = param_cb(params, cbarg);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
OPENSSL_free(pub_key);
OPENSSL_free(genbuf);
BN_CTX_end(bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return ok;
}
/* IMEXPORT = IMPORT + EXPORT */
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_DOM_PARAMETERS \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ENCODING, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_FIELD_TYPE, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_P, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_A, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_B, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_GENERATOR, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ORDER, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_COFACTOR, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_SEED, NULL, 0)
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PUBLIC_KEY \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, NULL, 0)
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PRIVATE_KEY \
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, NULL, 0)
# define EC_IMEXPORTABLE_OTHER_PARAMETERS \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, NULL)
/*
* Include all the possible combinations of OSSL_PARAM arrays for
* ec_imexport_types().
*
* They are in a separate file as it is ~100 lines of unreadable and
* uninteresting machine generated stuff.
*
* TODO(3.0): the generated list looks quite ugly, as to cover all possible
* combinations of the bits in `selection`, it also includes combinations that
* are not really useful: we might want to consider alternatives to this
* solution.
*/
#include "ec_kmgmt_imexport.inc"
static ossl_inline
const OSSL_PARAM *ec_imexport_types(int selection)
{
int type_select = 0;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0)
type_select += 1;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0)
type_select += 2;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
type_select += 4;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS) != 0)
type_select += 8;
return ec_types[type_select];
}
static
const OSSL_PARAM *ec_import_types(int selection)
{
return ec_imexport_types(selection);
}
static
const OSSL_PARAM *ec_export_types(int selection)
{
return ec_imexport_types(selection);
}
static int ec_get_ecm_params(const EC_GROUP *group, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
return 1;
#else
int ret = 0, m;
unsigned int k1 = 0, k2 = 0, k3 = 0;
int basis_nid;
const char *basis_name = NULL;
int fid = EC_GROUP_get_field_type(group);
if (fid != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
return 1;
basis_nid = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group);
if (basis_nid == NID_X9_62_tpBasis)
basis_name = SN_X9_62_tpBasis;
else if (basis_nid == NID_X9_62_ppBasis)
basis_name = SN_X9_62_ppBasis;
else
goto err;
m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (!ossl_param_build_set_int(NULL, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_M, m)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(NULL, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_TYPE,
basis_name))
goto err;
if (basis_nid == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) {
if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k1)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_int(NULL, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_TP_BASIS,
(int)k1))
goto err;
} else {
if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_int(NULL, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_PP_K1, (int)k1)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_int(NULL, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_PP_K2, (int)k2)
|| !ossl_param_build_set_int(NULL, params,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_PP_K3, (int)k3))
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
return ret;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC2M */
}
static
int ec_get_params(void *key, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
int ret = 0;
EC_KEY *eck = key;
const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
unsigned char *pub_key = NULL, *genbuf = NULL;
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
const char *propq;
BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(eck);
if (ecg == NULL)
return 0;
libctx = ec_key_get_libctx(eck);
propq = ec_key_get0_propq(eck);
bnctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx);
if (bnctx == NULL)
return 0;
BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE)) != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ECDSA_size(eck)))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS)) != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, EC_GROUP_order_bits(ecg)))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_SECURITY_BITS)) != NULL) {
int ecbits, sec_bits;
ecbits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(ecg);
/*
* The following estimates are based on the values published
* in Table 2 of "NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4"
* at http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4 .
*
* Note that the above reference explicitly categorizes algorithms in a
* discrete set of values {80, 112, 128, 192, 256}, and that it is
* relevant only for NIST approved Elliptic Curves, while OpenSSL
* applies the same logic also to other curves.
*
* Classifications produced by other standardazing bodies might differ,
* so the results provided for "bits of security" by this provider are
* to be considered merely indicative, and it is the users'
* responsibility to compare these values against the normative
* references that may be relevant for their intent and purposes.
*/
if (ecbits >= 512)
sec_bits = 256;
else if (ecbits >= 384)
sec_bits = 192;
else if (ecbits >= 256)
sec_bits = 128;
else if (ecbits >= 224)
sec_bits = 112;
else if (ecbits >= 160)
sec_bits = 80;
else
sec_bits = ecbits / 2;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, sec_bits))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DEFAULT_DIGEST)) != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, EC_DEFAULT_MD))
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH);
if (p != NULL) {
int ecdh_cofactor_mode = 0;
ecdh_cofactor_mode =
(EC_KEY_get_flags(eck) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) ? 1 : 0;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ecdh_cofactor_mode))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_TLS_ENCODED_PT)) != NULL) {
p->return_size = EC_POINT_point2oct(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
p->data, p->return_size, bnctx);
if (p->return_size == 0)
goto err;
}
ret = ec_get_ecm_params(ecg, params)
&& ec_group_todata(ecg, NULL, params, libctx, propq, bnctx, &genbuf)
&& key_to_params(eck, NULL, params, 1, &pub_key)
&& otherparams_to_params(eck, NULL, params);
err:
OPENSSL_free(genbuf);
OPENSSL_free(pub_key);
BN_CTX_end(bnctx);
BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
# define EC2M_GETTABLE_DOM_PARAMS \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_M, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_TYPE, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_TP_BASIS, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_PP_K1, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_PP_K2, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_CHAR2_PP_K3, NULL),
#else
# define EC2M_GETTABLE_DOM_PARAMS
#endif
static const OSSL_PARAM ec_known_gettable_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_BITS, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_SECURITY_BITS, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MAX_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_TLS_ENCODED_PT, NULL, 0),
EC_IMEXPORTABLE_DOM_PARAMETERS,
EC2M_GETTABLE_DOM_PARAMS
EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PUBLIC_KEY,
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_PUB_X, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_PUB_Y, NULL, 0),
EC_IMEXPORTABLE_PRIVATE_KEY,
EC_IMEXPORTABLE_OTHER_PARAMETERS,
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static
const OSSL_PARAM *ec_gettable_params(void *provctx)
{
return ec_known_gettable_params;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM ec_known_settable_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_TLS_ENCODED_PT, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
static
const OSSL_PARAM *ec_settable_params(void *provctx)
{
return ec_known_settable_params;
}
static
int ec_set_params(void *key, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
EC_KEY *eck = key;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_TLS_ENCODED_PT);
if (p != NULL) {
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(key));
int ret = 1;
if (ctx == NULL
|| p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING
|| !EC_KEY_oct2key(key, p->data, p->data_size, ctx))
ret = 0;
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (!ret)
return 0;
}
return ec_key_otherparams_fromdata(eck, params);
}
static
int ec_validate(void *keydata, int selection)
{
EC_KEY *eck = keydata;
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(eck));
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if ((selection & EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
ok = 1;
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
ok = ok && EC_GROUP_check(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ctx);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0)
ok = ok && ec_key_public_check(eck, ctx);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0)
ok = ok && ec_key_private_check(eck);
if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) == OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR)
ok = ok && ec_key_pairwise_check(eck, ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
struct ec_gen_ctx {
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
char *group_name;
char *encoding;
char *field_type;
BIGNUM *p, *a, *b, *order, *cofactor;
unsigned char *gen, *seed;
size_t gen_len, seed_len;
int selection;
int ecdh_mode;
EC_GROUP *gen_group;
};
static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection)
{
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
if ((selection & (EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS)) == 0)
return NULL;
if ((gctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*gctx))) != NULL) {
gctx->libctx = libctx;
gctx->selection = selection;
gctx->ecdh_mode = 0;
}
return gctx;
}
static int ec_gen_set_group(void *genctx, const EC_GROUP *src)
{
struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
EC_GROUP *group;
group = EC_GROUP_dup(src);
if (group == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_CURVE);
return 0;
}
EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
gctx->gen_group = group;
return 1;
}
static int ec_gen_set_template(void *genctx, void *templ)
{
struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
EC_KEY *ec = templ;
const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
if (gctx == NULL || ec == NULL)
return 0;
if ((ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)) == NULL)
return 0;
return ec_gen_set_group(gctx, ec_group);
}
#define COPY_INT_PARAM(params, key, val) \
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, key); \
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &val)) \
goto err;
#define COPY_UTF8_PARAM(params, key, val) \
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, key); \
if (p != NULL) { \
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) \
goto err; \
OPENSSL_free(val); \
val = OPENSSL_strdup(p->data); \
if (val == NULL) \
goto err; \
}
#define COPY_OCTET_PARAM(params, key, val, len) \
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, key); \
if (p != NULL) { \
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) \
goto err; \
OPENSSL_free(val); \
len = p->data_size; \
val = OPENSSL_memdup(p->data, p->data_size); \
if (val == NULL) \
goto err; \
}
#define COPY_BN_PARAM(params, key, bn) \
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, key); \
if (p != NULL) { \
if (bn == NULL) \
bn = BN_new(); \
if (bn == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &bn)) \
goto err; \
}
static int ec_gen_set_params(void *genctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
int ret = 0;
struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
COPY_INT_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, gctx->ecdh_mode);
COPY_UTF8_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, gctx->group_name);
COPY_UTF8_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_FIELD_TYPE, gctx->field_type);
COPY_UTF8_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ENCODING, gctx->encoding);
COPY_BN_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_P, gctx->p);
COPY_BN_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_A, gctx->a);
COPY_BN_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_B, gctx->b);
COPY_BN_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ORDER, gctx->order);
COPY_BN_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_COFACTOR, gctx->cofactor);
COPY_OCTET_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_SEED, gctx->seed, gctx->seed_len);
COPY_OCTET_PARAM(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_GENERATOR, gctx->gen,
gctx->gen_len);
ret = 1;
err:
EC_GROUP_free(group);
return ret;
}
static int ec_gen_set_group_from_params(struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx)
{
int ret = 0;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
if (bld == NULL)
return 0;
if (gctx->encoding != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ENCODING,
gctx->encoding, 0))
goto err;
if (gctx->group_name != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
gctx->group_name, 0))
goto err;
/* Ignore any other parameters if there is a group name */
goto build;
} else if (gctx->field_type != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_FIELD_TYPE,
gctx->field_type, 0))
goto err;
} else {
goto err;
}
if (gctx->p == NULL
|| gctx->a == NULL
|| gctx->b == NULL
|| gctx->order == NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_P, gctx->p)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_A, gctx->a)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_B, gctx->b)
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ORDER, gctx->order))
goto err;
if (gctx->cofactor != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_COFACTOR,
gctx->cofactor))
goto err;
if (gctx->seed != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_SEED,
gctx->seed, gctx->seed_len))
goto err;
if (gctx->gen == NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_GENERATOR,
gctx->gen, gctx->gen_len))
goto err;
build:
params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld);
if (params == NULL)
goto err;
group = EC_GROUP_new_from_params(params, gctx->libctx, NULL);
if (group == NULL)
goto err;
EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
gctx->gen_group = group;
ret = 1;
err:
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
return ret;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *ec_gen_settable_params(void *provctx)
{
static OSSL_PARAM settable[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ENCODING, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_FIELD_TYPE, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_P, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_A, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_B, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_GENERATOR, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_ORDER, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_BN(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_COFACTOR, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_SEED, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return settable;
}
static int ec_gen_assign_group(EC_KEY *ec, EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (group == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
return 0;
}
return EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) > 0;
}
/*
* The callback arguments (osslcb & cbarg) are not used by EC_KEY generation
*/
static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
{
struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (gctx == NULL
|| (ec = EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(gctx->libctx, NULL)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (gctx->gen_group == NULL) {
if (!ec_gen_set_group_from_params(gctx))
goto err;
} else {
if (gctx->encoding) {
int flags = ec_encoding_name2id(gctx->encoding);
if (flags < 0)
goto err;
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(gctx->gen_group, flags);
}
}
/* We must always assign a group, no matter what */
ret = ec_gen_assign_group(ec, gctx->gen_group);
/* Whether you want it or not, you get a keypair, not just one half */
if ((gctx->selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0)
ret = ret && EC_KEY_generate_key(ec);
if (gctx->ecdh_mode != -1)
ret = ret && ec_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ec, gctx->ecdh_mode);
if (ret)
return ec;
err:
/* Something went wrong, throw the key away */
EC_KEY_free(ec);
return NULL;
}
static void ec_gen_cleanup(void *genctx)
{
struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
if (gctx == NULL)
return;
EC_GROUP_free(gctx->gen_group);
BN_free(gctx->p);
BN_free(gctx->a);
BN_free(gctx->b);
BN_free(gctx->order);
BN_free(gctx->cofactor);
OPENSSL_free(gctx->group_name);
OPENSSL_free(gctx->field_type);;
OPENSSL_free(gctx->encoding);
OPENSSL_free(gctx->seed);
OPENSSL_free(gctx->gen);
OPENSSL_free(gctx);
}
void *ec_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
{
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
if (reference_sz == sizeof(ec)) {
/* The contents of the reference is the address to our object */
ec = *(EC_KEY **)reference;
/* We grabbed, so we detach it */
*(EC_KEY **)reference = NULL;
return ec;
}
return NULL;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH ec_keymgmt_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_NEW, (void (*)(void))ec_newdata },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ec_gen_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_SET_TEMPLATE,
(void (*)(void))ec_gen_set_template },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_SET_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ec_gen_set_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_SETTABLE_PARAMS,
(void (*)(void))ec_gen_settable_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN, (void (*)(void))ec_gen },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_CLEANUP, (void (*)(void))ec_gen_cleanup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_LOAD, (void (*)(void))ec_load },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_FREE, (void (*)(void))ec_freedata },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GET_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))ec_get_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GETTABLE_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))ec_gettable_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_SET_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))ec_set_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_SETTABLE_PARAMS, (void (*) (void))ec_settable_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_HAS, (void (*)(void))ec_has },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_MATCH, (void (*)(void))ec_match },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_VALIDATE, (void (*)(void))ec_validate },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT, (void (*)(void))ec_import },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_IMPORT_TYPES, (void (*)(void))ec_import_types },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT, (void (*)(void))ec_export },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_EXPORT_TYPES, (void (*)(void))ec_export_types },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_QUERY_OPERATION_NAME,
(void (*)(void))ec_query_operation_name },
{ 0, NULL }
};